Wolf warrior diplomacy

Former Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Zhao Lijian, considered one of the leading "wolf warrior diplomats"[1]
Wolf warrior diplomacy
Traditional Chinese戰狼外交
Simplified Chinese战狼外交

Wolf warrior diplomacy is a form of public diplomacy involving compellence adopted by Chinese diplomats in the late 2010s.[2][3][4] The term was coined from the title of the Chinese action film Wolf Warrior 2 (2017).[4][5] This approach is in contrast to the prior diplomatic practices of Deng Xiaoping and Hu Jintao, which had emphasized the use of cooperative rhetoric and the avoidance of controversy.[2][6]

Wolf warrior diplomacy is confrontational and combative, with its proponents denouncing any perceived criticism of the Chinese government, its ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and associated policies on social media and in interviews, as well as using physical violence against protestors and dissidents.[2][1][7][8] As an attempt to gain "discourse power" in international politics, wolf warrior diplomacy forms one part of a new foreign policy strategy called Xi Jinping's "Major Country Diplomacy" (Chinese: 大国外交; pinyin: Dàguó Wàijiāo) which has legitimized a more active role for China on the world stage, including engaging in an open ideological struggle with the Western world.[9][10]

Although the phrase "wolf warrior diplomacy" was popularized as a description of this diplomatic approach during the COVID-19 pandemic, the appearance of similar diplomatic rhetoric began a few years prior.[5] CCP general secretary Xi Jinping's foreign policy in general, perceived anti-China hostility from the West among Chinese government officials, and shifts within the Chinese diplomatic bureaucracy have been cited as factors leading to its emergence.

  1. ^ a b Jiang, Steven; Westcott, Ben. "China is embracing a new brand of foreign policy. Here's what wolf warrior diplomacy means". CNN. Archived from the original on 29 May 2020. Retrieved 30 May 2020.
  2. ^ a b c Yuan, Shaoyu (18 November 2023). "Tracing China's diplomatic transition to wolf warrior diplomacy and its implications". Humanities and Social Sciences Communications. 10 (1). doi:10.1057/s41599-023-02367-6. ISSN 2662-9992.
  3. ^ Mattingly, Daniel C.; Sundquist, James (24 November 2022). "When does public diplomacy work? Evidence from China's "wolf warrior" diplomats". Political Science Research and Methods. 11 (4): 921–929. doi:10.1017/psrm.2022.41. ISSN 2049-8470.
  4. ^ a b Huang, Zhao Alexandre (26 October 2021). ""Wolf Warrior" and China's digital public diplomacy during the COVID-19 crisis". Place Branding and Public Diplomacy. 18 (1): 37–40. doi:10.1057/s41254-021-00241-3. ISSN 1751-8040. PMC 8548864.
  5. ^ a b Martin, Peter (2021). China's Civilian Army: The Making of Wolf Warrior Diplomacy. Oxford. ISBN 978-0-19-751373-6. OCLC 1243010284.{{cite book}}: CS1 maint: location missing publisher (link)
  6. ^ "Europe, U.S. should say 'no' to China's 'wolf-warrior' diplomacy - EU envoy". Reuters. 10 December 2020. Archived from the original on 16 December 2021. Retrieved 16 December 2021.
  7. ^ "Hong Kong protester dragged into Chinese Consulate in Manchester and beaten". The Washington Post. Retrieved 17 October 2022.
  8. ^ "Taiwan official in hospital after alleged 'violent attack' by Chinese diplomats in Fiji". The Guardian. 19 October 2020. Retrieved 17 October 2022.
  9. ^ "China's "Wolf Warrior" Diplomacy in the COVID-19 Crisis". The Asan Forum. 15 May 2020. Archived from the original on 11 January 2022. Retrieved 9 January 2022.
  10. ^ Smith, Stephen N (16 February 2021). "China's "Major Country Diplomacy": Legitimation and Foreign Policy Change". Foreign Policy Analysis. 17 (2): orab002. doi:10.1093/fpa/orab002. ISSN 1743-8586.

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